Mr. President,
Madam General Secretary,
Honored ministers,
Ladies and gentlemen,
The twelve stars in the emblem of the Council of Europe
are a symbol of among other things the rhythmical passage of
time, with its twelve hours of the day and twelve months of the
year. The emblem of the institution in which I now have the honor
of speaking strengthens my conviction that I am speaking to people
who have a sensitive perception of the acceleration of European
time that we are witnessing today. People with an understanding
of someone like me, who not only desires but actually has the
duty to project this acceleration into political action.
If you will bear with me, I shall once again attempt to
think aloud on this subject, in a place that is perhaps the most
suitable environment of all for such reflections.
Let me start with a personal experience.
Throughout my life, whenever I thought about public affairs,
about civic, political and moral matters, some reasonable person
would inevitably start very reasonably to point out, in the name
of reason, that I too should be reasonable, should cast aside
my eccentric ideas, and finally accept that nothing can change
for the better because the world is divided once and for all into
two worlds. Both of these halfworlds are content with this division
and neither wants to change anything. It is pointless to behave
according to one's conscience because no one can change anything,
and anyone who does not want war should just keep quiet. I often
had to listen to this "voice of reason" following Brezhnev's
invasion of Czechoslovakia, after which such so-called "reasonable"
people felt much revived because they had been given a new argument
for their indifference to public affairs. They could say: "There
you are, that's the way it goes, they've written us off, nobody
cares, there is nothing we can do, everything's in vain, you'd
better learn your lesson and keep silent! Or do you want to go
to jail?"
I was far from the only one to disregard such wisdom and
continue to do what I thought right. There were many of us in
my country. We were not afraid of being considered fools. We went
on thinking about how to make the world a better place, and we
did not hide our ideas. Our efforts eventually merged into a single,
coordinated initiative which we called Charter 77. All of us in
the Charter, together and individually, thought about freedom
and injustice, about human rights, about democracy and political
pluralism, about a market economy and many other things. We thought,
and hence we also dreamed. We dreamed, both in and out of prison,
of a Europe without barbed wire, high walls, artificially separated
nations and gigantic stockpiles of weapons, of a Europe that had
discarded "blocs," of a European policy based on a respect
for man and human rights, of a politics not subordinated to transient
and particular interests. Yes, we dreamed of a Europe that would
be an amicable community of independent nations and democratic
states. When I had the chance to snatch a quarter of an hour's
conversation with my friend Ji_i Dienstbier (now deputy prime
minister and minister of foreign affairs) as we changed machines
at the end of a shift in the He_manice prison, we sometimes dreamed
of these things aloud. Later, when he was working as a stoker,
Ji_i Dienstbier wrote a book called Dreaming of Europe.
"What's the point of a stoker writing utopian notions of
the future when he can't exert the tiniest influence on this future
and can only bring more harassment upon himself?" asked the
friends of reason, shaking their wise heads uncomprehendingly.
And then a strange thing happened. Time suddenly accelerated,
and what would otherwise have taken a year suddenly happened in
an hour. Everything started to change at a surprising speed, the
impossible suddenly became possible, and the dream became reality.
The stoker's dream became the daily routine of the minister of
foreign affairs. And the advocates of reason have now divided
into three groups. The first are quietly waiting for some bad
things to happen that will serve them as yet another argument
in support of their nihilistic ideology. The second are looking
for ways to push the dreamers out of government and replace them
again with "reasonable" pragmatists, and the third are
loudly proclaiming that, at last, what they have always known
would happen has come to pass.
I am not telling you of this to ridicule my allegedly
reasonable fellow citizens, but for a very different reason: to
show that it is never pointless to think about alternatives that
may at the moment seem improbable, impossible, or simply fantastic.
We don't dream, of course, just because our dreams might
one day come in handy. We dream, as it were, as a matter of principle.
Yet it would now appear that there can be moments in history when
having "dreamed on principle" may in fact come in handy.
Time flies. It flies in this hall. I can therefore no
longer detain you with my literary reflections and must come to
the point.
First a few words about my country.
Following the attack against the students last November
17, our nations' patience finally gave out, and we quickly overthrew
the totalitarian system that had dominated our country for forty-two
years. We have set out on the road to democracy, to political
pluralism, and to a market economy. The press in our country is
free, and in a month's time we shall have our first free elections
in forty two years, with a broad range of political forces taking
part. I strongly believe that these elections will stand the test
in the eyes of all foreign observers as well. In our country there
is spiritual and intellectual freedom; once again, for the first
time since the Second World War, all the Catholic dioceses have
bishops, and the religious orders are functioning again.
Our state has no ideology. The only idea it wants to instill
in its domestic and foreign policy is a respect for human rights
in the broadest sense of the word, and an esteem for the uniqueness
of every human being. Among many other laws, our Parliament has
passed some important economic legislation to enact the transition
to a market economy and put meaning back into human labor. We
are preparing democratic constitutions for our federation and
for both national republics. We want at last to give full legal
expression to the identity of our two nations and ensure the collective
rights of our national minorities. We are a sovereign state, we
want to live in friendship with all nations, but if need be, we
are determined to defend that sovereignty.
I believe we have a right to the status of observer at
your Assembly, and I thank you on behalf of our people for having
granted us this status three days ago. I am firmly convinced that
the Council of Europe will understand and accept our application
for full membership.
What I have told you of my country does not mean that
Czechoslovakia today is an oasis of harmony. Quite the opposite.
We are now going through an extremely difficult period because
we are awash in vast array of enormous problems that were latent
and have only now surfaced, following our newly won freedom. From
the former regime we have inherited a devastated landscape, a
disrupted economy and, above all, a mutilated moral awareness.
The overthrow of totalitarian power was an important first
step, but it was just the beginning of our journey. We shall have
rapid progress, but there are many pitfalls ahead.
We find there is almost nothing we are good at and much
we have yet to learn. We must learn to create a political culture;
we must learn independent thinking and responsible civic behavior.
We are well aware of this, perhaps more so than many who
watch us from afar with concern and exasperation at our clumsiness.
I am not saying all this to gain an undeserved advantage,
or even to elicit your compassion, but because I am accustomed
to speaking the truth, even in a situation when it might seem
more advantageous to lie, or at least to keep silent. It is my
opinion that the advantage of a clear conscience cannot be eclipsed
by any other.
Now that I have briefly acquainted you with my country,
I can at last start thinking aloud about the Europe of today and
of tomorrow. These thoughts will not be simply a recapitulation
of some faroff dissident dreams. They also will reflect what I
have learned in office and from many conversations with the foreign
statesmen I have had the good fortune to meet.
It would be pointless to repeat what everybody knows,
that today unprecedented prospects are opening up for Europe:
the possibility of becoming a continent of peaceful and amicable
cooperation among all its nations.
I will therefore move directly to some specific measures
in the sphere of structures, institutions and treaties that must
be created and implemented, either at once or in some agreed-upon
sequence, if the newly emerging hope is to become a reality. I
shall start by assuming that the structures born of the old system
should either be smoothly transformed or merged into new structures,
or simply abolished and left to wither. Entirely new structures
should be created in parallel as starting points or seeds of a
future order. For the sake of clarity, let us divide this sphere
into four categories: security measures, and political, economic
and civic structures, institutions or mechanisms.
In the security and military sphere, the outward expression
of the postwar division of Europe, there are two existing pacts
-- the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. These are military
groupings of a rather different nature and history, and they have
different missions. While NATO was born as an instrument for the
defense of West European democracies against the danger of expansion
by the Stalinist Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was conceived as
an offshoot of the Soviet Army and as an instrument for Soviet
policy. The aim was to confirm the satellite status of the European
countries over which Stalin had gained control after the Second
Word War. If we then consider the geopolitical context namely
that the West European democracies adjoin the ocean in the West,
and the former Soviet satellites border upon the Soviet Union
in the East we can easily grasp the asymmetry of the whole situation.
In spite of this, I believe that in this radically new
situation both groupings should gradually move toward the ideal
of an entirely new security system, one that would be a forerunner
of the future united Europe and would provide some sort of security
or security guarantees. It could be a security community involving
a large part of the Northern Hemisphere. Hence the guarantors
of the process of unification in Europe would have to include
not only the United States and Canada in the West, but also the
Soviet Union in the East. When I speak of the Soviet Union, I
am thinking of the community of nations that country is in the
process of becoming today.
What are the implications of this for NATO and the Warsaw
Pact in the light of the asymmetry to which I have referred?
For both pacts, it means considerably strengthening the
role they are already playing to some extent, the role of political
players in joint disarmament negotiations. It also means the diminution
of their former role as instruments of defense of one half of
Europe against a possible attack from the other half. In brief,
both pacts should function more clearly as instruments of disarmament
rather than instruments of armament.
It seems that NATO, as a more meaningful, more democratic
and more effective structure, could become the seed of a new European
security system with less trouble than the Warsaw Pact. But NATO,
too, must change. Above all it should in the face of today's
reality transform its military doctrine. And it should soon
in view of its changing role change its name as well. This should
happen because of the victory of historical reason over historical
absurdity, and not because of a victory of the West over the East.
The present name is so closely linked to the era of the Cold War
that it would be a sign of a lack of understanding of presentday
developments if Europe were to unite under the NATO flag. If the
present structure of the West European security alliance can become
a precursor or a seed of a future panEuropean alliance, it is
certainly not because the West will have won the Third World War
but because historical justice has triumphed. A further reason
for changing the name is its obvious geographical inappropriateness.
In a future security system, only a minority of members would
border on the Atlantic Ocean.
As far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, it seems that
when it ends its role as the political instrument of European
disarmament, and as an escort of some countries in their return
to Europe, it will lose its purpose and dissolve. What originally
came into being as symbol of Stalinist expansion will, in time,
lose all its raison d'etre.
The great "Northern" security zone, as is obvious
at first sight, may essentially be called the "Helsinki"
zone: The countries which could, and should, belong to it are
in fact the participants in the Helsinki process. And what this
implies is obvious enough. The new structures, which would emerge
in parallel with the transformation or gradual dissolution of
the old structures, could grow out of the foundations of the Helsinki
process. The Czechoslovak proposal to establish a European Commission
for Security as a starting point for a united "Helsinki"
security system and a guarantee of a united Europe stems from
this idea. The participating states in the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe have been informed of this initiative,
and I don't need to explain it here once again. As the Warsaw
Pact gradually dissolves or loses its purpose and as NATO gradually
transforms itself, the significance of this Commission would grow,
along with any new structures around it.
Let me try to summarize these considerations. If the Helsinki
security process would start to expand from the field of recommendations
to participating states, to the sphere of joint treaty commitments,
a broad framework of guarantees could be created for the emerging
political unity of Europe.
The accelerated course of history compels us to immediately
project every political consideration into some comprehensive
timetable. I shall attempt to do this for the question at hand.
It is possible and let us hope it will happen that a
summit of the states participating in the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe will be convened in the course of this
year. I would like to assure those states proposing to hold it
in Prague that Czechoslovakia would consider this a great honor
and would do its utmost to ensure its success. However, more important
than the venue of this summit are its content and its purpose.
We have already suggested it could do more than is planned for
in the present agenda.
In the first place, the summit could if all the participating
states agreed establish the proposed European Commission for
Security, which would begin working as of January 1, 1991. Czechoslovakia
proposes Prague as its headquarters. The Secretariat, or its representative
part, could have its headquarters in one of the beautiful Prague
palaces near the Prague Castle. Of course it would be gratifying
if the first of these European institutions were given a mandate
to be located in Prague by a summit held in Prague, but naturally
this is not a precondition. The summit could establish those headquarters
in Prague even if it were held somewhere else.
This year's summit, should it be convened, could also
decide that the conference known under the working name of Helsinki
II and planned for 1992 would be held in the autumn of next year.
The third and most important decision that could be taken
at this year's summit would be one on the content and purpose
of Helsinki II and on the immediate start of its preparations,
for which purpose the proposed Commission also could serve. This
task would be the drafting and perhaps the signing of a new generation
of Helsinki Accords. The novelty of these Accords would be that
they would not merely consist of an extensive set of recommendations
to governments and states, but of a set of treaties on cooperation
and assistance in the sphere of security. In other words, there
would be some sort of obligation to provide mutual assistance
in the case of an attack from the outside and to submit to arbitration
in the case of local conflicts within the zone. Clearly, such
negotiations and accords would finally fix the existing European
borders and, through the system of treaties and guarantees, could
close the chapter on the Second World War and all its nefarious
consequences, mainly the prolonged and artificial division of
Europe.
In conclusion, by the end of next year the foundations
of a new and united "Helsinki" security system could
be laid, providing all European states with the certainty that
they no longer have to fear one another because they are all part
of the same system of mutual guarantees, based on the principle
of the equality of all participants and their obligation to protect
the independence of each participating country.
Allow me one more remark, concerning nuclear weapons in
Europe. These weapons produced never to be used have become
in the postwar period part of a security model that, paradoxically,
ensured peace through a balance of fear. The nations of Central
and Eastern Europe, however, paid a heavy price for the efficiency
of this nuclear model by remaining in the grip of a totalitarian
straitjacket.
An excessive quantity of any type of weapons, particularly
of the nuclear variety, inevitably disfigures the territory on
which it is deployed. This applies particularly to those that
can only reach beyond their backyards and which we call "tactical."
We therefore welcome President Bush's proposal to abandon
the planned modernization of these weapons. Should the summer
NATO conference decide on the gradual elimination of these less-modern
missiles, now deployed in Central Europe, we would welcome this
move with a great sense of satisfaction. What justification is
there for the existence of weapons that can only strike Czechoslovakia,
the eastern part of Germany now in the process of unification,
and possibly Poland? Whom will they deter? The new governments
elected in the first free elections after several decades? The
new, democratically elected parliaments?
I said in the Polish Parliament that our society sometimes
reminds me of freshly amnestied prisoners who have problems finding
their bearings under conditions of freedom. People are full of
prejudices, stereotypes and notions shaped by long years of totalitarianism.
Can they understand the purpose of weapons targeted at them? The
supporters of the former regimes in our country and elsewhere
are still lying in wait for their chance. It would be a historical
paradox if this chance were to be provided by those who helped
us in the past in our struggle against totalitarian regimes.
In my opinion, the main disaster of our modern world has
been its bipolarity, the fact that the tension between the two
main powers and their allies was indirectly transferred in one
way or another to the whole world. This situation persists to
this day. The world is constantly being torn apart by this tension
and stifled by the existing superpowers. The chief victims of
this unfortunate state of affairs are the one hundred or so states
inaccurately called the Third World, the developing world, or
the nonaligned world. The anxiety of this world over the possibility
that the emergence of a united "Helsinki" security zone
could only widen the gap between the North and the South is understandable
but groundless. The very opposite is true. It would be an important
step from bipolarity to multipolarity. In addition to the powerful
North American continent and the rapidly changing and liberating
community of nations of today's Soviet Union, we would have the
emergence of a large European connecting link. These three entities,
living in peace and mutual cooperation, would indirectly open
up new opportunities for a fully fledged existence to other countries,
other communities of countries. The entire international community
would start shifting from an arena of mutual competition, of direct
or indirect expansion of the two superpowers, into an arena of
peaceful cooperation among equal partners. The North would cease
to threaten the South through the export of its interests and
its supremacy. Instead it would radiate toward the South the idea
of equal cooperation for all.
Against the massive background of this broad "Northern"
or "Helsinki" security zone, or simultaneously with
its emergence, Europe could relatively swiftly, and without the
obstacles that until recently seemed insurmountable, become politically
integrated as a democratic community of democratic states. This
process would no doubt go through several stages and be mediated
by several different mechanisms. It may be that in the first stage,
say within five years, a community could be established on European
soil that we might call the Organization of European States and,
with the beginning of the third millennium, God willing, we could
start to build the European Confederation proposed by President
Mitterrand. With the gradual consolidation, stabilization and
growing competence of the future Confederation, the whole "Helsinki"
security system would ultimately become capable of ensuring its
own security, at which point the last American soldier could leave
Europe, because Europe would have lost its reason to fear Soviet
military strength and the unpredictability of that powerful country's
foreign policy.
Every move leading to this goal should be encouraged.
The more varied and parallel the attempts undertaken the better,
because the greater the chance will be that one of them will succeed.
Hence Czechoslovakia supports very different initiatives such
as various smaller, working regional communities as is Initiative
Four (the DanubianAdriatic Community), and is studying projects
such as Prime Minister Mazowiecki's idea for setting up a permanent
political body of the foreign ministers of all European states.
You will certainly understand why I have spoken so extensively about these ideas here in this Assembly, before the representatives of the oldest and largest political organization in Europe, one that has such solid foundations and has already done so much useful work. Yes, the spiritual and moral values on which the Council of Europe is based, and which are the common heritage of all European nations, are the best of all possible foundations for a future integrated Europe. I can see no reason why your Parliamentary Assembly and your executive bodies could not be the core around which a future European Confederation would crystallize. Czechoslovakia considers all the criteria for the admission of new states to the Council of Europe as excellent: It accepts them without reservations and rejoices that the Council of Europe is opening up to the emerging democracies of the former Soviet satellites, which are now building their relations with the Soviet Union on the principles of equality and full respect of the sovereignty of individual states. I am firmly convinced that the day will come when all European states will fulfil your criteria and will become full members of the Council. The Council of Europe was, after all, founded as a panEuropean institution, and it was only the sad course of history that turned it for so long into a merely West European institution.
Obviously, the states that had been ruled by a totalitarian system and now are overcoming its consequences and want, so to speak, to return to Europe, can most rapidly and efficiently do so not by competing and contending against one another but by helping one another in solidarity. If these countries want to open up to the new Europe, they must first open to one another. The new democratic government in Czechoslovakia, therefore, wants to do everything in its power to contribute to the coordination of efforts by the Central European countries to enter various European institutions. That is why we so often appeal to different institutions that are theoretically European but in fact are so far only West European, to open more flexibly to those who for long years were segregated and who logically belong in them.
The highest level of integration has no doubt been achieved by the twelve countries of the European Economic Community. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, working on the transition from a centralized "noneconomy" to a normal market economy and trying to enter the world of normal economic relations and achieve the convertibility of their currencies, now look upon the EC as a distant and almost unattainable horizon they should coordinate their journey toward the EC. On the other hand, the EC should create some flexible transitional ground, on which the economies of these states could more easily recover. This would not only serve the interest of these countries, but it would serve the interest of the EC itself and would further the ideal of an integrated democratic Europe.
The harsh lesson of living under a totalitarian system has taught us to respect human and civic rights, and it is no accident that the emerging democracies in our countries have mostly sprung from independent civic movements like the Czechoslovak Charter 77. We cannot forget the soil out of which we have grown and the principles that have governed our struggle for freedom. We therefore realize how indispensable it is that the efforts to integrate states, governments and parliaments be accompanied, or even inspired, by parallel civic efforts. For this reason, I have recently supported, along with Lech Walesa, a proposal for a European Civic Assembly. I trust that the West European governments will also demonstrate an understanding for this plan.
In conclusion, I should mention two topics that are of
interest to practically the whole world and closely related to
the future of Europe.
The first is Germany. We have already formulated the Czechoslovak
viewpoint, but I will repeat it. It was always clear to us that
the artificially divided German nation would one day unite in
a single state. There were times when such a view publicly proclaimed
sounded like a provocation, and was considered as such by many
Germans. We are glad, not only because we are not in favor of
the artificial division of any nation, but also because we perceive
the fall of the Berlin Wall as the fall of the whole Iron Curtain
and hence as a liberating phenomenon for us all. As we have said
time and again, the unification of Germany in a single democratic
state is no obstacle to the European unification process but should
in fact be understood as its motivating force. Our thoughts and
actions toward the construction of a new European order should
keep step with the unification of Germany. Hence we welcome the
so called Four-Plus-Two plan. At the same time, we fully understand
our Polish brothers' concern over the Western border of their
state. We consider this border as final and support Poland's full
participation in all negotiations related to its borders. Such
negotiations could, in our view, wind up at the Helsinki II conference,
which should not only formally confirm existing borders, as did
the first Helsinki conference, but provide legal guarantees for
them as well.
The second urgent theme is the future of the Soviet Union.
Czechoslovakia unreservedly recognizes every nation's right to
its own identity and to the free choice of its state and political
system. I am convinced that the present process of democratization
we are witnessing in the Soviet Union is irreversible. I am convinced
that all the nations of the Soviet Union will peacefully move
to the type of political sovereignty they desire, and that the
Soviet leadership will give precedence to the free transition
to this over the threat of a violent confrontation. The time is
not too distant when some republics will become completely independent
and others will establish a new type of community, whether a confederative
association or a looser type. In my view, there is no reason why,
against the background of an extensive "Helsinki" security
system, some or all of the European nations of the present Soviet
Union could not at the same time be members of a European confederation
and of some eventual "postSoviet" confederation. The
present Soviet leadership, which proclaims a scientific understanding
of historical processes, undoubtedly understands that all nations
naturally aspire to their own identity and that the present structure
of the Soviet state inherited from czarist, and later Stalinist,
hegemony is artificial. For all these reasons we believe that
the West should at last free itself from its traditional terror
of the Soviet Union. One can hardly admire Mr. Gorbachev and fear
him at the same time. We cannot endlessly scare one another with
the specter of hawkish, conservative forces poised to overthrow
Mr. Gorbachev and return the Soviet Union to the '50s. And in
no way can one cultivate this specter simply to provide the military
industry with work orders. There is no way back, and the future
of the world today no longer stands or falls with one person.
Nor is it any longer in anyone's power to stop this new and strikingly
forward-looking course of history.
In conclusion, allow me to mention an anxiety we frequently
meet with nowadays. The fear of national, ethnic and social conflicts
in the Central European arena, which might be fostered by long
unresolved and latently spreading problems. This fear leads to
the question as to whether our part of Europe will soon become
a powder keg of the Balkan type.
It is our common task to exclude the possibility of such
a threat and render such fears immaterial. This is chiefly the
responsibility of our countries, which must proceed with speed,
coordination and complete mutual understanding to solve the problems
we have inherited. But it is also the responsibility of the West
European countries, which could help us a great deal by supporting
us in this complicated process.
Dear participants,
In 1464 the Czech King George of Podebrady sent a momentous
message to the French King Louis XI, proposing that he preside
over a league of peace and invite Christian rulers to a convention
which, on the basis of binding international law, would prevent
war among members of the union and ensure their common defense.
It seems to me that it was no accident that one of the first serious
attempts toward a peaceful unification of Europe emerged from
Central Europe. As a traditional crossroads of all European conflicts,
this region has a particular interest in European peace and security.
I am happy to have been able to speak about these matters here
in Strasbourg, in a place that was once the symbol of traditional
conflicts and now is a symbol of European unity.
Honored by this opportunity to speak here at the most
important European political forum, I naturally devoted my attention
to political structures, systems, institutions and mechanisms,
but it doesn't mean I am not aware of the obvious that no truly
new structures can be set up, nor existing structures daringly
altered, without radical changes in human thinking and behavior,
and in social consciousness. Without courageous people, courageous
structural changes are unthinkable.
With this remark I come back to where I started that
is, to dreams. Everything seems to indicate that we must not be
afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly
impossible to become a reality. We shall never build a better
Europe if we cannot dream of a better Europe.
I understand the twelve stars in your emblem not as the
proud conviction that the Council of Europe will build a heaven
on this earth. There will never be a heaven on earth. But I perceive
these twelve stars as a reminder that the world can become a better
place if we sometimes have the courage to look up at the stars.